Author: LegalEase Solutions
QUESTION PRESENTED
- When can a court be said to be improperly playing the role of the trier of fact, particularly on the issue of proximate cause?
SHORT ANSWER
Proximate cause is generally a jury issue. But in certain circumstances it can become a question of law. If reasonable minds cannot differ on proximate cause, it becomes a matter of law to be decided by the court. Also, the court exceeds its authority when it decides a jury issue where the jury failed to find sufficient facts on the issue.
RESEARCH FINDINGS
Proximate cause or legal cause may be a question of fact or a question of law. It is generally a question of fact to be determined by the jury. But in certain circumstances, it can become a question of law to be determined by the court.
Under Michigan law, “[n]ormally, the court decides the questions of duty, general standard of care, and legal or proximate cause, while the jury decides the questions of cause in fact, specific standard of care, and damages.” Johnson v Bobbie’s Party Store, 189 Mich. App. 652, 659; 473 N.W.2d 796, 800 (1991) (citing Nolan v. Bronson, 185 Mich. App. 163, 169, 460 N.W.2d 284 (1990)).
However, it has also been held that “[t]he true rule is, that what is the proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily a question for the jury. It is not a question of science or of legal knowledge. It is to be determined as a fact, in view of the circumstances of fact attending it.” Milwaukee & St PR Co v Kellogg, 94 US 469, 474; 24 L Ed 256 (1876).
Hence, it can be said that ‘proximate cause’ may be a question for the jury or the court depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. The courts have decided differently in different situations.
The court in Pitcairn v Brandes has held “[u]nquestionably the issue of proximate cause must be submitted to the jury if there is substantial evidence to support it….” Pitcairn v Brandes, 87 F2d 928, 929 (CA 6 1937).
However, “[P]roximate cause may in some circumstances become a question of law.” Corrigan v E W Bohren Transp Co, 408 F2d 303(CA 6 1968) (See Ziebro v. City of Cleveland, 157 Ohio St. 489, 106 N.E.2d 161 (1952); Lawrence v. Toledo Terminal R.R., 154 Ohio St. 335, 96 N.E.2d 7 (1950); Patton v. Pennsylvania R.R., 136 Ohio St. 159, 24 N.E.2d 597 (1939)).
“Ordinarily, the determination of proximate cause is left to the trier of fact, but if reasonable minds could not differ regarding the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury, the court should rule as a matter of law.” Babula v Robertson, 212 Mich. App. 45, 54; 536 N.W.2d 834, 839 (1995) (citing Berry v. J & D Auto Dismantlers, Inc. 195 Mich. App. 481, 491 N.W.2d 585 (1992)).
“‘The jury, not the trial judge, is the trier of fact. Whenever a fact question exists, upon which reasonable persons may differ, the trial judge may not direct a verdict. Conversely, when no fact question exists, the trial judge is justified in directing a verdict.’” Vanderberg v Gen Motors Corp, 96 Mich. App. 683, 688-89; 293 NW2d 676, 679 (1980) (citing Caldwell v. Fox, 394 Mich. 401, 407, 231 N.W.2d 46, 49 (1975)).
If facts bearing upon aspects of proximate cause other than causation in fact are not in dispute and if reasonable minds could not differ about applying the legal concept of ‘proximate cause’ to those facts, then the issue is one of law for the court. But if reasonable minds could differ, the issue of ‘proximate cause’ is for the jury to decide based on the court’s instructions as to the law. Hence, where reasonable minds might differ regarding application of the reasonableness of the risk of harm, the question is best left to the jury.
Richards v Pierce, 162 Mich. App. 308, 317; 412 N.W.2d 725, 730 (1987) (quoting McMillan v. State Highway Comm., 426 Mich. 46, 63, 393 N.W.2d 332 (1986)).
- Non-Jury Case
“The Supreme Court of [] [Michigan] has frequently restated the rule that in a non-jury law case, the findings of fact by the trial judge will not be reversed unless contrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence.” Shaw v Wiegartz, 1 Mich. App. 271, 277; 135 N.W.2d 565, 569 (1965).
However, it should be noted that the court has also opined “[w]here facts in a nonjury law case are undisputed, [the] rule that findings of fact by [the] trial judge will not be reversed unless contrary to [the] clear preponderance of evidence is not applicable.” Stadelmann v Glen Falls Ins Co of Glen Falls, 5 Mich. App. 536; 147 N.W.2d 460 (1967).
“[W]here issues of fact have been decided by the circuit judge in a law case tried without a jury [] [the courts] do not reverse unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.” Hall v Horak, 329 Mich. 16, 20; 44 N.W.2d 848, 851 (1950). “The circuit judge is the trier of the facts and may give such weight to the testimony as in his opinion it is entitled to.” Id. (citing Vannett v. Michigan Public Service Co., 289 Mich. 212, 286 N.W. 216)). “It is the province of the trial judge in a nonjury case to draw legitimate inferences and weigh the probabilities from the established facts.” Id. (citing Hazen v. Rockefeller, 303 Mich. 536, 6 N.W.2d 770)). “The trial judge who heard the witnesses as trier of the facts is better able to judge of their credibility and the weight to be accorded their testimony, and [the courts] do not reverse unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.” Id. (citing Besh v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association, 304 Mich. 343, 8 N.W.2d 91 (1943)).
Under Court Rule 64 (1933) it may be said that the determination by th[e] court of whether ‘the judgment is against the preponderance of the evidence’ is a question of law rather than one of fact. This is true because, generally speaking, a judgment in a law case which is entered in favor of the party, notwithstanding the preponderance of the evidence is to the contrary, is a judgment entered in violation of law.
Jones v E Michigan Motorbuses, 287 Mich. 619, 648; 283 N.W. 710, 713 (1939)
2. Jury Case
“‘[T]he jury is the sole judge of the facts. It is the function of the jury alone to listen to testimony, weigh the evidence and decide the questions of fact’” People v Wolfe, 440 Mich. 508, 514-15; 489 N.W.2d 748, 751 (1992), amended (Oct. 9, 1992) (quoting People v. Palmer, 392 Mich. 370, 375–376, 220 N.W.2d 393 (1974)).
“‘In cases where the defendant invokes the right to a trial by jury, ‘the jury, not the judge, renders the verdict.’” People v Bearss, 463 Mich. 623, 629-30; 625 N.W.2d 10, 14 (2001) (quoting People v. Duncan, 462 Mich. 47, 54, 610 N.W.2d 551 (2000)).
“Generally, proximate cause is a factual issue to be decided by the trier of fact. However, if reasonable minds could not differ regarding the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury, the court should decide the issue as a matter of law.” Nichols v Dobler, 253 Mich. App. 530, 536; 655 N.W.2d 787, 790 (2002).
“When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts which the law makes essential to the punishment, and the judge exceeds his proper authority.” United States v Gabrion, 719 F3d 511, 547 (CA 6 2013) cert den 134 S Ct 1934; 188 L Ed 2d 963 (2014) (citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 304, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004)).
CONCLUSION
A judge may decide on a question of fact or a question of law. Proximate cause may be a question of fact or a question of law. In non-jury cases, the general rule is that, findings of fact by the court will not be reversed unless contrary to the preponderance of evidence. In jury cases, the judge may rule on a case when the evidence is insufficient for deciding the case. Therefore, to conclude, the judge/court improperly plays the role of trier of fact when the jury fails to provide sufficient evidence in a jury case.